Getting it quite wrong:Van Manen and Smith on Phenomenology by Zahavi, Dan
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Getting it quite wrong
Zahavi, Dan
Published in:
Qualitative Health Research
DOI:
10.1177/1049732318817547
Publication date:
2019
Document version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (APA):
Zahavi, D. (2019). Getting it quite wrong: Van Manen and Smith on Phenomenology. Qualitative Health
Research, 29(6), 900-907. https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732318817547
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
1 
 
Forthcoming in Qualitative Health Research. Please quote from published version  
DOI: 10.1177/1049732318817547 
 
Getting it quite wrong: van Manen and Smith on phenomenology 
 
Abstract: 
Max van Manen and Jonathan Smith have recently had an exchange in Qualitative Health 
Research concerning their respective use of phenomenology. I welcome the attempt to get clearer 
on what phenomenology amounts to and I agree with van Manen that an overly arbitrary use of 
term will lead to an erosion of the reputation of phenomenology. However, I think both of them 
are to blame for promoting various confusions concerning the nature of phenomenology. The aim 
of my article is to make some critical remarks concerning van Manen’s and Smith’s understanding 
of phenomenology and to suggest alternative resources for qualitative researchers interested in 
phenomenology.  
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Getting it quite wrong: van Manen and Smith on phenomenology 
 
As a philosopher who has published on phenomenology since 1989 and who for decades has 
worked to demonstrate and defend the vitality of phenomenology – most recently as editor of The 
Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology (2012) and The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of Phenomenology (2018), and as author of Husserl’s Legacy (2017), and Phenomenology: 
The Basics (2019) – I find it both perplexing and disheartening to read the recent exchange between 
van Manen and Smith in Qualitative Health Research (van Manen 2017a, 2017b, 2018, Smith 
2018). I welcome the attempt to get clearer on what phenomenology amounts to and I agree with 
van Manen that an overly arbitrary use of the term will lead to an erosion of the reputation of 
phenomenology. However, I think van Manen and Smith are both to blame for promoting various 
confusions concerning the nature of phenomenology. 
Let me first say a few words about Smith’s approach and then discuss van Manen’s in more 
detail. Let me also make it clear from the outset that my concern in this context is with Smith’s 
and van Manen’s understanding of phenomenology. I am not taking a stance on the general quality 
of their work. As I will eventually suggest, however, I think qualitative health researchers 
interested in phenomenology should look elsewhere for theoretical inspiration and methodological 
guidance. 
 
1. Interpretative phenomenological analysis 
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In recent years, Smith’s Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) has gained increasing 
popularity among qualitative researchers. Its focus is idiographic in that it seeks to understand how 
particular individuals experience particular events and life-episodes, and it has taken issue with 
the claim – promoted, for instance, by Giorgi (2012) – that a phenomenological psychology must 
remain descriptive. Smith holds that we, qua human beings, are always already engaged in 
interpretative meaning-making activities. Interpretation is a basic structure of our intentional life 
and is consequently not only permissible, but unavoidable.  
The approach of IPA is clearly qualitative. It is non-reductive and it seeks to provide rich 
experiential descriptions. But is that enough to secure its phenomenological credentials? Is it 
sufficient simply to consider the first-person perspective of the agent/patient/client in order to 
make the approach in question phenomenological? Phenomenologically informed qualitative 
research has different aims than phenomenological philosophy, but it is questionable whether the 
former can qualify as phenomenological if it either ignores or misinterprets the latter. In his co-
authored introduction to IPA, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis: Theory, Method and 
Research, Smith does offer brief descriptions of the theoretical work of Husserl, Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, but it is hard to see how their work is actually being put to use in the 
subsequent application of the method. Smith has claimed that his approach is phenomenological 
because it seeks to examine experience according to its “own terms, rather than according to 
predefined category systems”, and has also insisted that IPA has adopted suggestions from 
phenomenology about how to pay attention to and examine experience (Smith, Flowers, Larkin 
2009: 32). Moreover, in his recent exchange with van Manen, Smith has argued that since IPA 
takes the primary role of the researcher to consist in i) inviting the participant to share his sense 
making, (ii) witnessing its articulation, and (iii) in turn, making sense of it, this aligns IPA with 
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Heidegger’s conceptualization of hermeneutic phenomenology (Smith 2018: 1956). When 
confronted, on previous occasions, with the criticism that there is far more to phenomenology than 
this, Smith has replied that “philosophy does not own phenomenology” and that what philosophers 
have been doing is to formalize something that all of us were already doing (Smith, Flowers, Larkin 
2009: 32-33). As a philosopher trained in phenomenology, I find it hard to take any of this 
seriously. Not only does it belittle the actual contributions of philosophers like Husserl, Heidegger, 
and Merleau-Ponty, who were certainly not simply repacking commonsensical truisms. It also fails 
to recognize that the appeal to both subjective experience and sense making can be found in many 
other disciplines and traditions besides phenomenology.  
In his exchange with van Manen, Smith warns against being overly prescriptive about what 
counts as phenomenological and has insisted that no single person has the authority to prescribe 
rules about what does or does not constitute phenomenology (Smith 2018: 1956). This might be 
right, but we should not accept the flipside of this and simply accept any definition. 
Phenomenology might not be a copyrighted term, and various odd uses of it can be found in the 
contemporary landscape. By labelling itself the way it does, however, IPA clearly stresses the link 
between its own endeavor and the phenomenological research tradition. But that link does not 
amount to very much. 
 
2. Phenomenology in its original sense 
 
I share a good part of van Manen’s concern about Smith’s approach. However, I also have serious 
concerns about van Manen’s own account. Van Manen is a prolific writer, and in the following I 
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will focus only on his recent contributions to Qualitative Health Research (van Manen 2017a, 
2017b, 2018).  
A recurrent claim of van Manen’s is that we shouldn’t make do with the secondary 
literature, but that we ought to return to the origin and consult “the primary literature, tradition, 
and movements of phenomenology” (van Manen 2018: 1966). We should read the writings of 
leading phenomenologists such as Husserl, Stein, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty etc. (van Manen 
2017b: 824). van Manen also stresses that “phenomenology in its original sense is a 
philosophically based form of inquiry” (van Manen 2017b: 824) and that its practitioners must 
have a “scholarly commitment to orient to past and present leading phenomenological literature” 
(van Manen 2017b: 824). I agree with all of that and also think van Manen is quite sincere when 
he writes that he is “motivated and committed to the century-old philosophical and methodological 
scholarship of phenomenology”. The problem, however, is that van Manen’s own account and 
description of phenomenology is a vivid example of how that very tradition has been “poorly 
understood” (van Manen 2017a: 776).  
There are plenty of points to take issue with but let me in the following restrict myself to 
three. 
1. van Manen repeatedly claims that phenomenology is the study of the lived meaning of 
an experience and that the basic phenomenological question is the question of “what is this lived 
experience like” (van Manen 2017a: 776). This is simply untrue. The irony is that when van Manen 
claims that phenomenology is the “pursuit of insight into the phenomenality of lived experience” 
(van Manen 2017a: 779), he is not giving us the original sense of phenomenology but is 
unwittingly propagating the same superficial and trivialized understanding of phenomenology that 
one can find in some contemporary cognitive science and analytic philosophy of mind. In both of 
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the latter disciplines, there is an increasing recognition that a scientific account of consciousness 
must include and address phenomenology. In both cases, however, the terms “phenomenology” 
and “phenomenological” are often used as synonyms for “phenomenality,” i.e., as labels for the 
qualitative character of experience. To discuss phenomenology in that context is consequently to 
discuss a certain dimension of experience and at best to offer first-person descriptions of what the 
‘what it is like’ of experience is really like. This way of talking about phenomenology has, 
however, little to do with phenomenology understood as a specific method or tradition in 
philosophy. When thinkers like Husserl, Scheler, Sartre, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty engaged 
in phenomenological philosophizing, they most definitely were not simply seeking to offer fine-
grained descriptions of the qualitative character of different experiences; they were not simply 
seeking to attend to hitherto unreflected and unnoticed aspects and details of lived experience. To 
suggest that they were is to utterly miss out on the philosophical character of their work. Consider, 
for a moment, the actual content of some of the major works in phenomenology. Take Husserl’s 
Logical Investigations (1900-01), a recognized milestone in twentieth-century philosophy and 
indisputably a work of phenomenological philosophy. This is the work, where Husserl made his 
famous claim concerning the need for returning to the ‘things themselves’ (Husserl 2001/I: 168). 
What type of content does one find in the book? Among the many topics treated in the book, one 
can, for instance, find Husserl’s defence of the irreducibility of logic and his analysis of part-whole 
relationships. Thus, Husserl spent considerable effort showing that logical principles could not be 
reduced to psychological regularities. He also discussed the relation between wholes and parts, 
and carefully distinguished pieces (or independent parts) and moments (or non-independent parts). 
Whereas a piece, say, a leaf or leg, can exist independently of the whole (a tree or body) to which 
it belongs, moments, such as a hue or a pitch, cannot exist on their own. A hue can only exist as 
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part of a colour, and a pitch only as part of a sound. Analyses like these are not about what various 
experiences are really like. The same holds true if we go to Husserl’s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy I, or to his The Crisis of European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, to Heidegger’s Being and Time, or to Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. Amassing experiential descriptions is a poor substitute for 
the systematic and argumentative work that we find in the phenomenological philosophers. 
Offering descriptions of “what this experience is like” would not allow us to elucidate the kind of 
questions that the phenomenological philosophers have often been occupied with, say, the relation 
between perceptual intentionality and scientific rationality, the link between subjectivity and 
objectivity, the difference between empathy and inferential mindreading, or the relation between 
the individual and the community. It is no coincidence that many of the phenomenologists 
dismissed a purely descriptive endeavour devoid of systematic ambitions as mere ‘picture-book 
phenomenology’ (Spiegelberg 1965: 170; Scheler 1973: xix).  
 Perhaps van Manen would offer the following rejoinder: How can one deny that 
phenomenologists are concerned with the phenomenality of experience, with what it is like to 
experience this or that phenomenon? After all, in his article “Phenomenology in its original sense”, 
van Manen quotes extensively from Heidegger’s analysis of what it is like to be bored and also 
discusses Levinas’ and Marion’s analyses of what it is like to experience the face of another. My 
claim, however, is not that phenomenologists are not interested in the phenomenality of 
experience, my claim is that phenomenology cannot be reduced to a concern with that topic. When 
phenomenological philosophers are providing the kind of analyses that van Manen is interested in, 
they are doing so for a systematic purpose. The descriptions in question are means rather than 
ends. To think otherwise is fundamentally to misconceive the philosophical character of 
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phenomenology. Taking Heidegger’s analysis of boredom as an example, van Manen argues that 
the traditional distinction between philosophical phenomenology and human science based 
phenomenology is difficult to sustain (van Manen 2017b: 816). Perhaps van Manen is right. 
Perhaps we do need to rethink that distinction, but the argument he provides is spurious. When 
considering Heidegger’s concrete description of boredom, one should not overlook the systematic 
context in which it occurs. Heidegger’s most extensive discussion of boredom can be found in a 
lecture course titled The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Heidegger 1995). The reason 
Heidegger engages with boredom is that he thinks it can provide us with a deeper understanding 
of fundamental ontological questions. Heidegger’s concern with these types of questions is not to 
be distinguished from his phenomenology, as if Heidegger was in reality engaged in two different 
projects, an ontological and a phenomenological. There is a reason why Heidegger in Being and 
Time can write that ontology is only possible as phenomenology, and that the analysis of our being-
in-the-world is the key to every ontological exploration (Heidegger 1996: 31), just as there is a 
reason why he in History of the Concept of Time can declare “there is no ontology alongside a 
phenomenology. Rather, scientific ontology is nothing but phenomenology” (Heidegger 1985: 72). 
Likewise, we shouldn’t distinguish Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of consciousness from 
his concern with metaphysics and epistemology. On the contrary, as Husserl repeatedly makes 
clear, his approach to philosophical questions, including questions of metaphysics and 
epistemology, is a phenomenological approach. Indeed, as Husserl writes in a letter to Peter Wust 
from 1920, phenomenology was from the beginning never supposed to be anything except the path 
to a radically genuine “strictly scientific metaphysics” (Husserl 2014: lxiv). One cannot even start 
to comprehend Heidegger’s and Husserl’s claims as long as one believes that the fundamental 
question of phenomenology is to understand what it is like to have this or that experience.  
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2. Another repeated claim made by van Manen in his recent papers is that the fundamental 
method of phenomenology is the reduction and the epoché (van Manen 2017b: 819). I agree, but 
when van Manen then sets out to explain the function and purpose of the epoché and reduction, he 
once again gets it wrong. In his view, the reason phenomenologists employ the epoché and the 
reduction is because this will allow them to grasp “the phenomenological meaning of a human 
experience” (van Manen 2017b: 819) and permit them to investigate the “primal, eidetic, or 
inceptual meanings that are passed over in everyday life” (van Manen 2017b: 812). If, however, 
we turn to the work of Husserl – which is where we ought to look if we want to understand the 
epoché and the reduction1 – this is hardly the explanation we find.2 Husserl often contrasts 
philosophy proper with the work done by the positive sciences. The latter are so absorbed in their 
investigation of the natural (or social/cultural) world that they do not pause to reflect upon their 
own presuppositions and conditions of possibility. They all operate on the basis of a natural (and 
necessary) naivety, namely the tacit belief in the existence of a mind-independent reality. This 
realist assumption is so fundamental and deeply rooted that it is not only accepted by the positive 
sciences, it also permeates our daily pre-theoretical life, for which reason Husserl calls it the 
                                                          
1 As should be well known, Husserl is the only major figure among the classical phenomenologists 
who consistently and explicitly made use of the epoché and the reduction. Whether the other 
phenomenologists rejected his methodological prescriptions, or rather simply took them for 
granted, is a matter of scholarly debate.  
2 I have discussed the motivation for introducing the epoché and the reduction in extenso in 
previous publications, so the following can only serve as a brief overview. For a more extensive 
treatment, see Zahavi 2003, Zahavi 2017, Zahavi 2019. 
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‘natural attitude’. Regardless of how natural this attitude might be, if philosophy is supposed to 
amount to a radical form of critical elucidation, it cannot simply take our natural realist 
assumptions for granted, but must instead engage in a reflective move that allows it to explore and 
assess the epistemic and metaphysical presuppositions of the latter.  
This is where the epoché enters the picture. To avoid simply presupposing the validity of 
realism, we need to suspend our acceptance of the natural attitude. We keep the attitude (in order 
to investigate it), but we bracket its validity. The purpose of the epoché is not to doubt, ignore, 
neglect, abandon, or exclude reality from our research, but to suspend or neutralize a certain 
dogmatic attitude towards reality. By suspending this attitude and by thematizing the fact that 
reality is always revealed and examined from some perspective or another, reality is not lost from 
sight, but for the first time made accessible for a proper investigation (Husserl 1970: 151-152). 
Indeed, for Husserl, a philosophical exploration of reality does not consist in inventorying the 
content of the universe, but in accounting for the conditions under which something can appear as 
real. Rather than making reality disappear from view, the epoché is precisely what allows reality 
to be investigated philosophically. It is only thereby that the phenomenologist can accomplish his 
main, if not sole, concern, namely to transform “the universal obviousness of the being of the 
world—for him the greatest of all enigmas—into something intelligible” (Husserl 1970: 180). 
To perform the epoché is to effectuate a thematic re-orientation. It is not as if we cannot 
continue to observe, thematize and make judgments concerning the world, but we must do so in a 
reflective manner that considers the world as related to the perspective we bring to bear on it. By 
adopting the phenomenological attitude, we do not turn the gaze inwards in order to examine the 
happenings in a private interior sphere. Rather, we look at how the world shows up for the subject. 
We pay attention to how and as what worldly objects are given to us. By doing so, by analyzing 
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how and as what any object presents itself to us, we also discover the intentional acts and 
experiential structures in relation to which any appearing object must necessarily be understood. 
 
In the reorientation of the epoché nothing is lost, none of the interests and ends of world-
life, and thus also none of the ends of knowledge. But for all these things their essential 
subjective correlates are exhibited, and thus the full and true ontic meaning of objective 
being, and thus of all objective truth, is set forth. (Husserl 1970: 176) 
 
 In Crisis Husserl describes phenomenology as the final gestalt (Endform) of transcendental 
philosophy (Husserl 1970: 70). Rather than amounting to an exploration of what a given 
experience is like, Husserl’s phenomenology offers a fundamental account of the nature of reality 
and objectivity. Strictly speaking, the epoché can be seen as the first step towards what Husserl 
terms the transcendental reduction, which is his name for the systematic analysis of the correlation 
between subjectivity and world. For Husserl, the greatest and most important problems in 
phenomenology are related to the question of how objectivities of different kinds, from the 
prescientific ones to those of the highest scientific dignity, are constituted by consciousness. 
Indeed, “it is therefore a matter of inquiring, in the most comprehensive universality, into how 
Objective unities of any region and category are ‘constituted in the manner peculiar to 
consciousness’” (Husserl 1982: 209). 
Both epoché and reduction can consequently be seen as elements in a philosophical 
reflection, the purpose of which is to liberate us from our natural(istic) dogmatism and make us 
aware of our own constitutive contribution, make us aware of the extent to which our own 
subjective accomplishments are at play when worldly objects appear in the way they do and with 
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the validity and meaning that they have. By effectuating the epoché and by carrying out the 
reduction, Husserl ultimately came to embrace the view that reason, truth and being are essentially 
interlinked, and that the right place to locate objectivity is in, rather than beyond, the appearing 
world.  
3. The final point I take issue with concerns van Manen’s repeated claim that 
phenomenology aims to dwell “inceptually” in the meaning of an experience for which we do not 
really have the proper words. He talks of how the unique feature of phenomenology is that it 
focuses on the originary meaning of the experiences as we live though them prior to any linguistic 
articulation (van Manen 2018: 1964). This is an idea that van Manen has promoted for many years. 
Indeed, in his early work, van Manen insisted not only that phenomenology should take its point 
of departure in the lifeworld, the world of the pre-reflective, pre-theoretical attitude. He also 
suggested that phenomenology should remain at this level, since he claimed that the task of 
phenomenology was to describe how we experience the world pre-reflectively, prior to any 
classification and taxonomization (van Manen 1990: 9).  
There are two main problems with this characterization. First of all, if it were really the case 
that the aim of a phenomenological study is “to let a phenomenon (lived experience) show itself 
in the way that it gives itself while living through it” (van Manen 2017b: 813), then 
phenomenological studies would arguably be superfluous. There would be nothing for 
phenomenology to do, since the goal in question is achieved automatically whenever we 
experience something. This follows directly from a key tenet in classical phenomenology, the idea 
namely that consciousness is characterized by pre-reflective self-givenness (Zahavi 1999). Here 
is, for instance, what Husserl says in On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal 
Time: 
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The flow of the consciousness that constitutes immanent time not only exists but is so 
remarkably and yet intelligibly fashioned that a self-appearance of the flow necessarily 
exists in it, and therefore the flow itself must necessarily be apprehensible in the flowing. 
The self-appearance of the flow does not require a second flow; on the contrary, it 
constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself (Husserl 1991: 88). 
 
The aim of the phenomenological description cannot be simply to reproduce the original 
experience unaltered. Rather, as Husserl points out, at the beginning we are confronted with the so 
to speak dumb experience that must then be made to articulate its own sense (Husserl 1960: 38). 
One aim of the phenomenological work is consequently to disclose, disentangle, explicate, and 
articulate those components and structures that are implicitly contained in the pre-reflective 
experience (Husserl 2008: 242, Zahavi 2015). Perhaps this is what van Manen had in mind all 
along, but then the task is precisely not to simply let the experience show itself in the way it does 
when it is lived through.  
 Secondly, van Manen’s suggestion that phenomenology should restrict itself to a study of 
the lived, pre-reflective, pre-predicative meaning of an experience is also wrong, since an 
important part of the phenomenological work is to understand the transition between our pre-
reflective and pre-conceptual grasp of the world and our subsequent conceptualization of and 
judgment about it. How does the theoretical attitude that we employ when we conduct science 
arise out of and change our pre-theoretical being-in-the-world? Husserl described this process in 
Crisis and Experience and Judgment. It was also a topic that both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger 
worked on extensively. 
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3. Conclusion 
 
As should be clear by now, I do not think that either van Manen or Smith is offering anything close 
to phenomenology in its original sense. “So what?” some might say. As should be clear, however, 
I am not objecting to the fact that van Manen and Smith are departing from phenomenology. I am 
objecting to the way they characterize their own work and to the fact that they despite their 
departure continue to claim that their approaches are aligned with the philosophical 
phenomenology of thinkers like Husserl, Heidegger, or Merleau-Ponty. But if qualitative 
researchers interested in phenomenology are not best served by consulting the work of van Manen 
and Smith,3 what should they do? Let me by way of conclusion briefly point to some alternative 
resources.  
1. Anybody promoting a method, procedure, or approach that is supposed to merit the label 
“phenomenological” should be familiar with phenomenological theory and with its philosophical 
origin. With the continuing publication of Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, and Merleau-Ponty’s lectures, 
research manuscripts and working notes, scholarship on these seminal figures is quite different 
today than 30-40 years ago (cf. Zahavi 2018, 2019). Qualitative researchers interested in 
phenomenology ought to familiarize themselves with at least some of this new research. Had they 
done so, some of the strange claims found in the qualitative research literature might have been 
avoided. Consider, for instance, Paley’s claim that Husserl tried to “break out of experience (into 
the realm of pure consciousness) through the phenomenological reduction” (2013: 148), or 
                                                          
3 For some critical remarks about Giorgi’s approach, see Zahavi 2019. 
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Horrigan-Kelly, Millar and Dowling’s claim that “Heidegger’s concept of being involved 
reformulating the question of being that had proved a challenge for earlier philosophers by 
challenging the concept of being as a dualism” (2016: 2). Indeed, sometimes the mistakes are 
appalling as when Dowling in an article titled “From Husserl to van Manen” not only claims that 
Husserl founded an empirical philosophy and defended a positivist type of phenomenology 
(Dowling 2007: 131, 134) but also manages to misspell the names of Hegel (Hegal), Merleau-
Ponty (Merleu-Ponty), Kierkegaard (Kierkagaard), and Dreyfus (Druyfus) (Dowling 2007: 132, 
137).  
2. If one is interested in the question of how phenomenology can be applied and developed 
outside of its philosophical home, one should look beyond the different proposals currently found 
within the qualitative research literature. There are very successful applications of phenomenology 
to be found elsewhere, applications that can offer substantial theoretical and methodological 
inspiration and support to qualitative researchers. Relevant resources include the work of classical 
phenomenological psychologists, such as David Katz, Erwin Straus or Franz From, the tradition 
of phenomenological psychiatry, with figures such as Karl Jaspers, Eugène Minkowski, Wolfgang 
Blankenburg, Louis Sass or Josef Parnas, or contemporary discussions of what has become known 
as “naturalized phenomenology.” 
In his book Lived Time from 1933, the psychiatrist Minkowski did not only discuss how 
insights from philosophical phenomenology could expand psychiatric knowledge and be used in 
clinical practice, he also emphasized how philosophical phenomenology might learn from its 
engagement with psychiatry and psychopathology. By disclosing various experiential anomalies, 
psychopathology could not only help the philosopher distinguish accidental regularities from truly 
essential features, but also bring the taken-for-granted, unnoticed conditions of normal existence, 
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be it at the level of intentionality, intersubjectivity, or self-experience, into sharp relief (Minkowski 
1970: 7-8). 
Seven decades later, a group of researchers with extensive clinical experience and expertise 
in philosophical phenomenology went on to develop a qualitative and semi-quantitative 
psychometric checklist called EASE (Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience) (Parnas et al. 
2005). EASE, which consists of 57 items ordered in different experiential and existential domains, 
was designed to be used in semi-structured interviews in order to facilitate a systematic and 
comprehensive clinical exploration of various experiential anomalies. In addition to contributing 
to a better psychopathological understanding of these phenomena, the use of this 
phenomenological instrument has also benefitted the patients. It has allowed for earlier detection 
and identification of those with high risk for developing schizophrenia and thereby also permitted 
earlier therapeutic interventions (Møller et al. 2011, Nelson et al. 2012). 
For years, the discussion of phenomenology within qualitative research appears to have 
taken place in a surprisingly insular fashion. Many qualitative researchers seem quite unfamiliar 
with the important developments that have occurred in the cognitive sciences since the early 
nineties. Back in 1991, the authors of The Embodied Mind heralded Merleau-Ponty as someone 
who already early on “argued for the mutual illumination among a phenomenology of direct lived 
experience, psychology and neurophysiology” (Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991: 15). Since then 
an increasing number of scientists and scholars have argued that cognitive scientists interested in 
consciousness should learn from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty and that phenomenological tools and 
concepts could be used in developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, clinical psychology, 
psychiatry, neuroscience and even biology (Varela 1996, 1997, Gallagher 1997, Petitot et al. 1999, 
Lutz and Thompson 2003, Thompson 2007, Gallagher & Zahavi 2012). Although this approach 
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continues to remain a minority view in cognitive science, the initial publications by Varela, 
Thompson, Gallagher and others triggered an intense and ongoing debate. It led to the launch of 
the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences and to a number of phenomenologically 
informed empirical studies of, for instance, narrative identity, pre-reflective experience, mental 
imagery, action coordination, embodied habits, interpersonal understanding, skilful coping, 
existential feelings, collective intentionality, etc., that unequivocally demonstrated the fecundity 
of the phenomenological approach. Phenomenology can not only make a difference in the 
handling, analysis and interpretation of the data, but also in how the data are obtained in the first 
place – be it, for instance, through the development of special interview techniques or by 
influencing the experimental design (cf. Gallagher 2003, Petitmengin 2006, Høffding and Martiny 
2016). 
3. For Husserl, the epoché and the reduction are crucial components of the 
phenomenological method. As I pointed out above, however, the epoché and the reduction are also 
explicitly connected to very specific philosophical aims and pursuits. They are essential to 
Husserl’s transcendental philosophical project. It is much less obvious that they are also notions 
that everybody seeking to apply phenomenology outside of philosophy must constantly bear in 
mind. There are other features of phenomenology that are considerably more relevant to the 
qualitative researcher. Consider, for instance, phenomenology’s criticism of scientism and its 
recognition of the importance of the lifeworld, its insistence on developing an open-minded and 
non-biased attitude (which is not to be conflated with the effectuation of the epoché), and its careful 
analysis of human existence, where the subject is understood as an embodied and socially and 
culturally embedded being-in-the-world. Rather than trying to adhere to Husserl’s, Merleau-
Ponty’s, or Heidegger’s recommendations regarding how to apply phenomenology, let alone 
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seeking to adopt their philosophical method, qualitative researchers should rather strive to let their 
own research be informed by central phenomenological concepts such as lifeworld, intentionality, 
empathy, pre-reflective experience, horizon, historicity and the lived body, etc. Consider, for 
instance, how a health care professional by drawing on notions such as perceptual intentionality, 
the lived body, sense of agency, empathy, or temporality might be able to elucidate how different 
dimensions of human existence are affected in pathology, illness or difficult life-circumstances, 
and thereby generate new insights or allow for better therapeutic interventions. It is often claimed 
that a qualitative researcher who wishes to conduct phenomenological research must start out by 
performing the epoché in order to bracket any preconceived beliefs, opinions or notions about the 
phenomenon being researched (which, to repeat, happens to be a misinterpretation of the epoché). 
By contrast, my recommendation is that the qualitative researcher should not only forget about the 
epoché (there is no need for a general suspension of our natural attitude) but should also approach 
and investigate the phenomenon (or conduct the interview) in light of quite specific prior ideas and 
notions, namely notions taken from phenomenological theory. To conduct phenomenologically 
informed qualitative research is not merely a question of being open-minded and interested in first-
person experience. It is very much also about adopting and employing a comprehensive theoretical 
framework concerning the subject’s relation to him- or herself, to the world, and to others.  
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